Abstract. Today, the international community faces two major development challenges, how to ignite growth and how to establish democracy. Economic research has identified two plausible hypotheses regarding this association. The first hypothesis emphasizes the need to start with democracy and institutions that secure property rights. The second hypothesis emphasizes the need to start with physical and human capital accumulation. In this paper we discuss some of the econometric evidence on the relationship between institutions, human capital, and agricultural productivity growth across developed and developing countries with the objective of finding support for one or the other hypothesis. We use Barro type growth and timing regressions of agricultural growth per worker and TFP rates for a panel of countries during the 1961-2001 period. We find that most variables used in the literature to capture the effect of institutions are not independent of the process of growth. While no evidence of causation from political institutions to agricultural productivity growth is found, human capital accumulation emerges as an important source of growth.
What comes first, agricultural growth or democracy?
I. Introduction.
Today, the international community faces two major development challenges, how to ignite growth and how to establish democracy. There is a correlation between GDP and democracy as casually can be observed by comparing Western Europe with Africa. This correlation has been a motivation for 'exporting' democracy to some countries arguing it would improve their economy. Democracy is associated with more civil and political freedoms, less abuse, respect for citizens' priorities, and in that sense, it has a value of its own. But how important is democracy for economic growth? In this paper we revisit the debate on the association between economic success and development of political institutions.
Economic research has identified two plausible hypotheses regarding this association. The first hypothesis emphasizes the need to start with democracy and institutions that secure property rights. Once political institutions are in place, investment in physical and human capital follows and with it, economic growth. The second hypothesis emphasizes the need to start with physical and human capital accumulation.
As a consequence of education and capital accumulation, income growth will follow with improvement in political institutions.
These two views of economic and political development share some important similarities. They both emphasize the need for secure property rights to support investments in human and physical capital, and they both see such security as a public policy choice. The first theory, referred to as the institutional view, hypothesizes that political constraints on government are a pre-requisite to investments. The second theory, referred to as the development view, proposes that pro-investment policies are choices made by political leaders, whether constrained or not. Countries offered as evidence of this development strategy are China, Chile, and most East Asian tigers during the last century.
The institutional view emphasizes the need to start with democracy and other checks on government mechanisms for securing property rights, then investments in physical and human capital happen and growth follows. We find that Montesquieu (1748) and Smith (1776) as well as, more recently, Buchanan and Tullock (1962) ; North and Thomas (1973); and North (1981, 1990) , have emphasized the importance of constraining government. Recent work on economic growth has resurrected interest on this line of thought. Work by DeLong and Shleifer (1993) ; Knack and Keefer (1995) ; Mauro (1995) ; Hall and Jones (1999) ; Acemoglu, et al. (2001 Acemoglu, et al. ( , 2002 Acemoglu, et al. ( , 2005 Acemoglu, et al. ( , 2006 Acemoglu, et al. ( , 2008 ; Persson and Tabellini (2006a , 2006b has emphasized the notion that political institutions of limited government cause economic growth.
The development view emphasizes a need to start with physical and human capital accumulation for growth to follow. Then, or maybe simultaneously with, economic growth there will also be an improvement on political institutions. In this view, secure property rights, for example, are not an exclusive characteristic of a democracy. It is possible for secure property rights to be a policy choice by a pro-market dictator. In this view, countries differ in their stock of human and social capital which can be acquired through policies pursued even by dictators, and institutional outcomes depend on these endowments. Democracy and institutional improvements then are consequence of growth, not its causes. Lipset (1960) , who is closely associated with this view, attributes this hypothesis to Aristotle. According to Lipset, the key to empowering citizens to engage with political institutions is education. It is education that allows courts to operate so that people resolve issues through negotiation and not through violence. Work by Barro (1999) ; Alvarez et al. (2000) ; Przeworski (2004a Przeworski ( , 2004b ; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer (2003) ; Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer (2004) ; Glaeser, Ponzetto, Shleifer (2007) ; Bova and Coviello (2007) ; Castello-Climent (2008) ; and Siourounis (2008a, 2008b) have supported Lipset's hypothesis, the view that growth leads to better institutions.
These two views have some points in common: an emphasis on securing property rights, and the belief that these right are a public policy choice. They differ, though, in that for the institutional view pro-investment policies and thus growth are consequences of political constraints on government, while for the development view these policies are choices of leaders who are not necessarily politically constrained.
In this paper we revisit these two general approaches and incorporate this debate into the discussions among agricultural economists measuring and trying to understand the patterns of agricultural productivity growth. More and more we encounter work in this area that has referred to 'unorthodox' models, at least from an agricultural economics perspective. In addition to traditional variables such as inputs, R&D and relative prices, models have included cultural and institutional variables in an attempt to understand the context in which the production process takes place and to understand their influence on efficiency and technical change. Given the importance of this sector in the process of growth and democratization of less developed economies, this paper will look for potential evidence supporting one or the other hypothesis.
There are now many studies that measure, or attempt to explain, the patterns of agricultural productivity growth across countries. Some Ludena et al. (2007) .
Only the studies by Gradner; Fulginiti, Perrin and Yu; Pfeiffer; Alauddin, Headey and Prasada Rao; and Bharati and Fulginiti include some proxy for institutional variables.
Only one of these studies, the one by Alauddin, Headey and Prasada Rao, uses one of the proxies for political institutions used in the general economic growth literature mentioned above.
In this study we first introduce the alternative proxies that have been used in the general economic literature to capture the effect of political institutions and we summarize critical reviews of them. Then we use them along with estimates of partial and multifactor agricultural productivity growth 2 looking for empirical evidence that would support one or the other position in this debate.
Here we are concern with the empirical evidence in agriculture, a sector that has been the source of financing for industrial development in the past and is still a most important engine of growth in many developing countries of Africa and Asia. Will the comparative evolution of the sector tell us if productivity growth happened in countries that had instituted stable democracies, or is agricultural productivity growth unrelated to the choice of political system? Can we establish causality, or can we just go as far as establishing correlation?
In this paper we will discuss some of the econometric evidence on the relationship between institutions, human capital, and agricultural productivity growth across developed and developing countries with the objective of finding support for one or the other view presented above. We will, in addition, try to obtain information by looking more deeply into the experience of developing countries that were 'poor' in the 1960's; a big proportion of them with important agricultural sectors, low levels of education and run by dictators. We will also present Barro's analysis of timing that will add evidence on whether schooling or institutional outcomes come first. Variables from this data set were used in the studies by Hall and Jones; and by Acemoglu et al (2001, 2002) .
2) The 'government effectiveness" variable developed at the World Bank by Kaufmann, et al. (2002 Kaufmann, et al. ( , 2003 . This data set starts in 1996 and is composed of indices that represent aggregation of subjective assessments of institutional quality.
These include "perceptions of the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies."
These concepts do not represent political constraints and in fact, they are the results of a process of development and once again might be correlated with growth. The study by Rodrick, Subramanian, and Trebbi uses the proxies in this data set. 4 3) The Polity IV data set, developed by the political scientists Jaggers and Marshall (2000) at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, is the best of these three data sets as it attempts, at least in theory, to measure limits of executive power and permanence. According to the authors they are concerned with capturing checks and balances in the decision making process. The criticism of this data set has to do with the volatility of the country scores and their lack of independence from election results. This index may show an improvement when elections in a country take place and are relatively free, even if there is no independence of powers in the country.
This volatility contradicts the property of permanence in institutions that the proxies should capture, although it is in theory the best of the three sets. 2) Proportional Representation: equals one if candidates to parliament (upper and lower houses) are elected using a proportional representation system, otherwise zero.
The other two proxies are based on the work of La and emphasize constitutional rules of checks on the executive by the judiciary:
3) Judicial Independence: permanency in office of supreme court judges.
4) Constitutional Review: extent of judicial review of legislation.
In Table 1 we present correlations between two measures of agricultural productivity in year 2000 and the two groups of proxies, those that have been used in the literature and those that have been proposed. Table 1 indicates that the proxies used in the literature are correlated with agricultural productivity growth. This is consistent with institutions having a causal effect on productivity but also with the reverse causality. Plurality and proportional representation have a much lower correlation while judicial checks and balances are relatively uncorrelated with agricultural productivity growth.
III. Agricultural Productivity Growth and Political Institutions.

Barro type OLS growth regressions.
We follow the general growth literature and run a series of Barro type regressions.
We use two different dependent variables measuring agricultural productivity growth. The frontier distance function uses as right hand side variables the quantity and quality of inputs and some institutional variables. They include the index of democracy from Polity IV as proxy for political institutions. The proxy for productivity in this case is very different than when using output per worker. First, it is supposed to measure output growth while accounting for the effects of growth in all inputs, not only labor. In addition, it attempts to correct for input quality and some institutional differences.
Lastly, it is the prediction from a stochastic parametric estimation. It is expected that this measure will be very different from the simple output per worker (although this one is closer to the measure used in the macro literature, GDP per capita).
It is more and more common in the agricultural economics literature to find Tables 2 and 3 confirm the now standard observation that growth rates decline with initial levels of the dependent variable or that convergence is occurring. One reason that temporal average assessments of the 'choice' variables might be significant is that they might improve as the economy gets richer, in other words they are endogenous, too, and there is reversed causality. Growth regressions typically use the initial level of education (instead of the average to isolate this possibility), so in the next set of regressions below, we try using the initial level of one of the 'choice' variables, 'Executive constraints' at the beginning of the period. This variable is chosen over the other 'choice' proxies for institutions because it is clearly not a consequence of dictatorial choices (even if it has some other problems as we mentioned before). Of all the 'choice' variables used in the literature this one is closer, in theory, to representing constraints on government.
Tables 4 shows three more Barro type growth regressions of agricultural production per worker by decades and for the whole period. All three regressions share two right hand side variables, share of the population leaving in temperate zone and initial production per worker. The first regression adds initial level of the variable 'Executive constraints', the second regressions uses initial years of schooling instead, and the third includes both. Table 5 runs the same regressions but using TFP growth as a dependent variable.
Both tables show that initial period constraints on the executive have no predictive power for subsequent productivity growth, while initial human capital is a strong predictor. In Tables 6 and 7 First we proceed with a regression of growth in years of schooling, using five year intervals, on initial schooling, initial measures of political institutions (captured by the 'choice' variables used in the literature) and initial level of agricultural output per worker.
We also include country fixed effects. In Table 8 we see that there is convergence in schooling, and that there is a large positive effect of output per worker. It also shows no effects of any of the political institution variables on the growth of human capital.
Second, we regress changes in political institutions, in five year intervals, on the same variables: initial schooling, initial measures of political institutions, initial levels of output per worker and country fixed effects. In Table 9 we see that initial levels of schooling are a strong predictor for improving institutional outcomes over the next five years. Initial productivity has no predictive power.
The same regressions are repeated but instead of using initial output per worker, we use the econometrically estimated initial TFP level as a right hand side variable. The results are similar except that initial TFP level is insignificant in both regressions.
Results of these regressions are inconsistent with the hypothesis that political institutions predict subsequent improvements in human capital. In fact they support Lipset's view that high human capital leads to institutional improvement.
V. The record on productivity growth, human capital, and institutions.
We have examined the record on the relationship between institutions and productivity growth using econometrics. A simpler way to assess these records is by examining the raw data. The objective is to discover any regularity in the data in terms of association between agricultural growth, schooling, and democracy.
We first look at years of schooling in 1960 across political regimes measured by the average democracy score from the Polity IV database. The sample median of 2.7 average years of schooling is considered an upper limit for low human capital, while high human capital is average years of schooling above 5, which is the lower limit of the 75 th percentile.
This cross classification is presented in Table 12 . Each cell tells us the number of countries in 1960, in our sample with the characteristics in that cell. We are looking for evidence to answer the following questions: 1) Are the countries with high education level the ones with stable democracy?
Yes, of a total of 18 highly educated countries, 16 are democracies.
2) Are all dictatorships poorly educated?
Yes, of a total of 21 dicatatorships, 20 are poorly educated.
This table reinforces our econometric results and lends support to Lipset's hypothesis: politics seems to have been more benign in countries with higher schooling.
The next classification, presented in Tables 13 and 14 , shows average agricultural productivity growth (growth of output per worker in Table 13 and TFP growth in Table   14) 2)Have stable democracies grown faster? Yes, democracies have grown slightly faster than imperfect democracies and much faster than dictatorships.
One interesting fact to notice is that while in 1960 most poor countries were dictatorships, some have managed to grow while others have not. This indicates that some of these countries have grown even under dictatorships.
Another question of interest is : who actually leads the less educated countries over time? If we add to the classification above a third concept, the number of years leaders stayed in power, we obtain some useful information. In 66 percent (44% for intermediate education) of the years in our sample, low education countries are led by autocratic leaders that last at least five years, and in 50 percent of the years by autocrats with tenure of at least 10 years. On the other hand the data shows that 6 percent of the years countries are led by democratic leaders with less than a 5 year tenure and in 13 percent of the years by democratic leaders with more than 5 years in power. There is a concentration of dictatorships that last for long terms.
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This information is only suggestive of associations between politics and education but it provides additional evidence that for understanding productivity growth a focus on factor accumulation might be more relevant than a focus on institutions.
VI. Conclusions and Future Directions.
First we have settled on North's definition of institutions. Then we have learned that there are two theories to understanding the relationship between political institutions and growth. One of them, the institutional theory, hypothesizes that constraints on political institutions are necessary to establish clear property rights so that investments follow and with that growth. The other, the development theory, hypothesizes that factor accumulation follows well enforced property rights and that they could be achieved with or without constrained political institutions. Once factor accumulation happens, then growth happens and with it an increase in the set and an improvement in the quality of political institutions. There are two types of variables that could be used or are being used to capture the impact of institutions on productivity growth. One type reflects choices (by policy makers, dictators or not), while the other reflects constraints that have to be respected by democratic leaders. Given North's definition of institutions, the first type may confound constraints on governments with dictatorial choices, so they do not proxy institutions. Most studies have used the first type, which in some cases move (are correlated) with productivity.
We econometrically confirm the propositions found in macro studies, that initial level of human capital of a country, and the average level of its institutions over a period of time predict productivity growth over that same period. We find that initial levels of constraints on the executive do not predict productivity growth, where as initial levels of human capital do.
We find that instrumental variables used in the institutional literature (settler mortality and population density in 1500) are highly correlated with human capital. We also see that schooling performs better than institutions in explaining productivity growth in agriculture. This seems to confirm the hypothesis that Europeans brought themselves and with that not only their institutions but their know-how and 'guns, germs, and steel.'
When we look at the econometric evidence on the timing of human capital accumulation and institutional quality we find that human capital and productivity cause changes in institutions. No evidence is found on the reverse causation.
A casual look at raw data for the countries in this study shows that most poor countries in 1960 had uneducated populations and were run by dictators and have since spent a number of years under dictators. These dictatorships had a large dispersion of growth rates. It is highly likely that the security of property that led to factor accumulation in these countries has been a result of a policy choice not of constraints on governance.
This debate is certainly not over, with recent papers in the macro literature being able only to establish association. Work by Persson and Tabellini (2006a , 2006b ; Siourounis (2008a, 2008b) ; Zajar and Zingales (2006); and Acemoglu et al. (2006 and Acemoglu et al. ( , 2008 has emphasized the need for inclusion of more detailed and complex concepts related to institutional reform, the alternative processes of transition to democracy, and in particular the factors that affect the permanency of a democracy. The common thread between these papers is the recognition that modeling the relationship between income and political institutions is difficult with most authors tending towards a common ground in which historical factors have lead to a particular resource distribution, a particular level of human and physical capital, particular economic institutions and distribution of power that simultaneously affect the evolution of income and democracy. 6 This study does not imply that institutions do not matter, as they certainly do. Rather, this study suggests that in doing research one should be careful about a clear definition and the proxies used for institutional arrangements. In terms of policy, it seems that the experience of a number of countries, captured in our econometrics, indicates that from the perspective of security of property needed for investments and growth, constraints on government (democratization) do not necessarily come first as such security could be a dictator's choice.
The information in this paper provides evidence that for understanding productivity growth in agriculture a focus on factor accumulation is more relevant than a focus on institutions. In particular a focus on human capital accumulation could be very promising. May be this association would serve as motivation for 'exporting' schooling rather than democracy in the hopes of improving the economies of some countries.
A cautionary last word for this study. I want to clearly state that this research does not intend to deny the merits of democracy as essential human values in their own right. It is well established that with respect to torture, death penalty, freedom of the press, religious freedom, and other human and civil rights, democracies are superior to dictatorships. Ag worker, 1961 Log Ag TFP growth 1970 log Panel C: Mean standard deviation of the 10-year TFP growth rates across countries.
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